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State Prisoners, Federal Courts, and Playing by
the Rules: An Analysis of the Aldisert
Committee's Recommended Procedures for
Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases
In the past fifteen years, prisoners in state correctional facil-
ities and local jails filed more than seventy-five thousand peti-
tions in federal courts' under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983.' Section 1983 complainants seek relief for depri-
1. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 135 (1971) (Table 17) [hereinafter cited by appropriate year, e.g., 1971
ANNUAL REPORT]; 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 207 (Table 24); 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 62 (Table
21). Annual Reports have reported state prisoner civil rights petitions as a separate sta-
tistic since 1966, when 218 petitions were filed. The 15 year total is 75,101. In forma
pauperis denials are not docketed, and thus not reported to the Administrative Office.
The number of prisoner cases actually presented to the federal courts is, therefore,
higher. See discussion of in forma pauperis screening at notes 84-104 infra.
2. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)). The
1979 amendment extended the Act's protection to the District of Columbia. See District
of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). In extending
civil rights protection, Congress affirmed the desirability of a "neutral Federal forum in
which to air [a] complaint, instead of being forced to sue . . . state officials in State
Courts." H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 1, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2609, 2609. State officials (but not agencies) and municipalities (but not
state governments) are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monnell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Over Justice Powell's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court has held that section 1983 encompasses claims based on purely statu-
tory violations of federal law as well as constitutional deprivations. Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1 (1980) (deprivation of welfare benefits under Social Security Act).
The essential elements of a section 1983 action are "(1) whether the conduct com-
plained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether
this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1913 (1981).
Unlike its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976), the civil remedy does not require
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vations of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of
state authority. State prisoners challenge the conditions of their
confinement, such as living space, sanitation, medical care, and
food.3 The petitions allege acts by state employees violating such
rights as free exercise of religion,4 access to the courts,3 commu-
nication,' and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.7
The constitutional deprivation may be grave - more than a
year in solitary confinement as retaliation for unpopular Black
Muslim beliefs and jailhouse lawyering activity8 - or slight -
seven packs of cigarettes taken by a guard without due process
of law.' In either case, broad statutory language permits the
specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right. 101 S. Ct. at 1913; Baker v. McCol-
lan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1979). See generally I. SENSENICH, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW ON
PRISONERS' RIGHTS 69-121 (1979), 16-26 (Supp. 1981).
3. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). When a state prisoner asserts that vio-
lation of constitutional rights in his criminal trial proceedings requires his release from
custody, he brings a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Although the
lines sometimes blur, habeas corpus actions challenge the fact or length of custody, while
section 1983 actions challenge the conditions of custody. Analysis of 644 cases filed in
district courts in Massachusetts, Vermont, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the
Northern and Eastern Districts of California showed that medical care, property loss or
damage, and interference with access to the courts were the most frequently raised
claims, while censorship of reading, racial and ethnic discrimination, grooming restric-
tions, search and shakedown, religious problems, sexual and other harassment were
infrequent (each category presented less than five percent of the claims). Turner, When
Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HAv.
L. REv. 610, 622-23 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). A Buddhist prisoner sought access to
the prison chapel and the right to correspond with his religious advisor. The lower
court's denial, with no hearing or findings of fact, was reversed per curiam.
5. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Prisoners have a right "to present
to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights."
Id. at 579. Prison authorities must provide either adequate law libraries or assistance
from persons trained in the law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). In general, limitations on
prisoners' mail must be no greater than necessary to protect an articulated government
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Id. See generally I. SENSENICH, supra
note 2, at 125-38, Supp. at 28-30.
7. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The eighth amendment, applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment, "embodies 'broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' . . . against which we
must evaluate penal measures." Id. at 102.
8. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v.
Oswald, 404 U.S. 1049 (1971), and Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
9. Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973). Chief Justice Burger cited the case
with dismay for engaging the attention of "one District Judge twice, three Circuit Judges
on appeal and six other circuit judges in a secondary sense - to say nothing of lawyers,
court clerks, bailiffs, court reporters and all the rest." Speech delivered to the American
Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 6, 1973), quoted in Aldisert, Judicial Expan-
sion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and
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state prisoner to take his complaint directly to a federal court.
He is not impeded by a minimum amount in controversy, 10 nor
must he exhaust either administrative or state judicial reme-
dies.11 By 1980, one out of fourteen civil cases filed in federal
district courts was a prisoner section 1983 petition.12
Prisoner section 1983 complaints are a recent and distinc-
tive phenomenon in the federal courts. In the past fifteen years,
the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & THE SocIALJ ORDER 557, 569-70 n.55.
In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Supreme Court held
that section 1983 protects property as well as personal rights. In the 1980 October term,
the Court rejected the notion that any property loss inflicted by a state employee consti-
tutes a constitutional deprivation. Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981). The Court
stressed that Nebraska's tort claims procedure was sufficient to satisfy due process when
the loss of the prisoner's mail order package arose because of a state employee's negli-
gence. Id. at 1917. The State had argued that de minimis property loss ($23.57) can not
be protected by the fourteenth amendment; the Court did not follow this suggestion.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4) (1976). Congress has never required section 1983 plain-
tiffs to meet a minimum amount in controversy. "The deprivation may be of the slightest
conceivable character, the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five
dollars or even five cents; . . . and yet by this section jurisdiction of that civil action is
given to the Federal courts .... " CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 216 (1871)
(remarks of Sen. Thurman), quoted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 179-80 (1961). In
contrast, most plaintiffs asserting federal questions had to plead a minimum $10,000
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Congress abolished this amount in controversy require-
ment in 1980. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1981)).
11. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), established that Congress intended
the federal statute to supplement existing state remedies for deprivations of constitu-
tional rights. The general rule is that exhaustion of state judicial or administrative reme-
dies is unnecessary. See, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971); McCray
v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied as improvidently granted, 426 U.S.
471 (1976). This is so even when the state has adopted a grievance procedure. See, e.g.,
Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823
(7th Cir. 1978).
Congress created a limited exhaustion of remedies mechanism under the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 (West Supp. 1974-80)). Courts may continue section 1983 cases for
up to 90 days under certain criteria. See notes 118-24 infra and accompanying text. In
light of this legislation, the Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded a prisoner's
complaint of loss of property during a shakedown. Jenkins v. Brewer, 101 S. Ct. 1338
(1981). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, had affirmed
dismissal of the section 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Jen-
kins v. Brewer, 624 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but
by its later disposition once again avoided analysis of an exhaustion requirement in pris-
oner section 1983 cases.
For discussion of arguments against an exhaustion requirement, especially for pris-
oners, who "may be in an even more vulnerable position than a black man in the post-
war South," see Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 68 (1980).
12. In 1980, state prisoners filed 12,397 section 1983 petitions, as compared with a
total 168,789 civil filings, a ratio of 1:13.6. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 62
(Tables 20 & 21).
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finite judicial resources were strained by a 138% increase in civil
filings,1 3 while during the same period prisoner civil rights peti-
tions increased over 5500%."' This disproportionate statistic is
not the whole picture, however. Prisoner civil rights cases actu-
ally consume minimal court time. Judges dismiss over ninety
percent before pretrial."6 The cases are only half as likely to go
to trial as other civil actions.16  One district, for example,
reported 833 prisoner section 1983 cases, nearly thirty percent of
its civil caseload. Those petitions, however, consumed only five
trial days.17
The expeditious removal of almost all prisoner section 1983
cases from the docket before pretrial is evidence of a distinctive
procedural response. Frequently, judges and court personnel
have moved away from the uniform Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, proceeding instead under local court rules or unwritten
practices not applicable to other civil cases. This Comment
examines that response, and in particular the procedures recom-
mended by a Federal Judicial Center committee.'8 The Aldisert
13. Id. at 62 (Table 20). Civil filings increased 138%, from 70,906 cases in 1966 to
168,789 cases in 1980.
14. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 135 (Table 17); 1980 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 62 (Table 21). Prisoner civil rights petitions increased 5586%, from 218
petitions in 1966 to 12,397 in 1980. Concern about the federal court caseload should not
obscure a fundamental purpose of those courts: adjudication of constitutional and fed-
eral statutory claims. The administrative burden, however, is of great practical concern,
and becomes a constitutional problem if the "crushing weight of cases-whatever their
worth-ultimately denigrates all rights." Whitman, supra note 11, at 27.
15. 1971-1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at Table C4. The actual figures are
81% in 1980, 79% in 1979, and then a remarkable uniformity of 90.1 to 91.9% for the
years 1970 to 1978. Id.
Turner's study showed that the predominant reason (68% of all cases filed in 1978)
for the termination of prisoner actions before pretrial was court dismissal prior to service
of process on the named defendant. Turner, supra note 3, at 618. The Annual Report
does not break down the statistic.
16. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has reported termina-
tions of state prisoner civil rights petitions as a separate statistic since 1971. 1971-1980
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at Table C4. The 11 year average of prisoner cases reach-
ing trial is 4.3%, compared with 8.3% of all civil cases. Id. In 1980, 3.7% of prisoner
section 1983 actions went to trial, compared with 6.5% of all civil actions. 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 1, at A-26 (Table C4).
17. In 1978, the Eastern District of Virginia had the heaviest caseload in the nation.
Prisoner section 1983 cases comprised 29.3% of all civil cases. Five trial days sufficed for
the 833 cases filed in 1978. Turner, supra note 3, at 660, 662 app. B. In the 664 cases
examined by Turner, only 21 had either an evidentiary hearing or a trial. Id. at 663. In a
two and a half year period, the Eastern District of California devoted one court day to
prisoner section 1983 complaints. Id. at 624.
18. Circuit Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert (U.S. Court of Appeals Third Circuit) chaired
The Prisoner Civil Rights Committee, formed in 1975 to examine the handling of section
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Committee published its final report"' in 1980, concluding that
both judicial economy and the just disposition of individual pris-
oner cases can best be accomplished by singling out section 1983
suits for treatment different from that accorded other civil
actions.2 0 This Comment disagrees. Where the procedures con-
flict with statutes or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they
exceed the limits of courts' rule-making authority, calling into
question the legitimacy of disposing of prisoner cases in this
manner. Further, local court rules responding to one category of
civil litigation undermine the uniformity of procedure sought by
the Federal Rules. If, additionally, the recommendations do not
effectively promote the purpose of procedure in federal courts,
"the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action, ' 1 the Committee's procedural response to the perceived
problem of prisoner section 1983 complaints may be short-
sighted and less appropriate than some existing statutory
alternatives.
The Comment first will recapitulate the full range of proce-
dural initiatives proposed by the Aldisert Committee for adop-
tion as local court rules. Then it will analyze the Committee's
recommendations relating to pleading forms and screening the
complaints before service of process, the critical stage at which
courts dispose of most prisoner complaints. Although concluding
that important aspects of the recommended procedures are fun-
1983 cases in federal court. Three district court judges, a magistrate, and a law professor
served on the committee.
19. PRISONER CIVIw RIGHTS COMMITrEE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED
PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ALDISERT REPORT].
20. Id. at 4, 7-28. In addition to the recommended procedures and forms, the focus
of this Comment's analysis, the Aldisert Report emphasized the need for development of
administrative grievance procedures within correctional institutions, and the importance
of increasing the use of state courts, particularly to deal with meritorious prisoner com-
plaints that do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. d. at Intro. ix-x, 29-42.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "govern the procedure in
the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature .... They shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." The
original grant of rule-making authority to the courts contained these precepts. In 1793,
Congress authorized courts to make rules "in a manner not repugnant to the laws of the
United States, to regulate the practice of said courts respectively, as shall be fit and
necessary for the advancement of justice, and especially to that end to prevent delays in
proceedings." Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 335 (adapted from Act of March
8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276, and from Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83).
For discussion of the limits of courts' rule-making authority, see notes 47-50 infra
and accompanying text.
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damentally inconsistent with federal statutes and rules, this
Comment acknowledges the valid concerns generating the Com-
mittee's proposals, and then suggests alternative judicial actions
responsive to the phenomenon of state prisoner civil rights com-
plaints in federal courts.
A SUMMARY OF THE ALDISERT COMMITTEE PROPOSALS
At the initiative of Chief Justice Burger, the Federal Judi-
cial Center, research arm of the federal courts,2 2 formed a com-
mittee to study the prisoner petition phenomenon. After a five-
year study, solicitation of district judges' and magistrates' views,
and two draft reports, the Aldisert Committee published Recom-
mended Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in
the Federal Courts.23 The procedures are used in at least half
the circuits." The Federal Judicial Center has circulated the
22. Congress established the Federal Judicial Center in 1967 as the research, devel-
opment, and training arm of the federal judiciary. 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (1976). The
Center recommends improvements in court administration and management to the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States. The Chief Justice of the United States serves as
chairperson of both entities. The Center operated with a staff of 136 and an $8.5 million
budget in fiscal year 1980. 1980 ANNUAL REP ORT, supra note 1, at 19 (Table 19), 28
(Table 20).
23. ALDISERT REPORT, supra, note 19. The Federal Judicial Center circulated two
tentative drafts to the bench and bar (May 1977 and Jan. 1978) and distributed a one
page questionnaire (Sept. 15, 1977). See note 24 infra. The final Report is available on
request from the Federal Judicial Center's Information Services, 1520 H St. N.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20005.
24. A Federal Judicial Center survey in September, 1977, indicated that a judge or
magistrate in 57 of 94 judicial districts used at least the in forma pauperis procedures in
77.3% of the prisoner civil rights cases filed. Memorandum from Alan J. Chaset, research
staff to members of the Aldisert Committee, at 7 (Feb. 15, 1978) (on file at the Univer-
sity of Puget Sound Law Review offices). While admitting the low return rate's effect on
reliability (23.2% of the 976 questionnaires sent to district judges and magistrates were
returned), Chaset concluded there was "broad acceptance of our report and wide use of
our recommended standards and procedures." Id. at 9.
Courts in five circuits cite the Aldisert procedures specifically- Second Circuit, Ron v.
Wilkinson, 565 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 970 (1978); Mignone
v. Vincent, 411 F. Supp. 1386, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Third Circuit, United States v.
Fayette County, Pa., 599 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Lightcap, 567
F.2d 1226, 1234 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977); Dougherty v. Harper's Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758,
761 n.3 (3d Cir. 1976); Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18 n.9, 19 n.10 (3d Cir. 1976);
Fourth Circuit, Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950-51, 952 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979); Gordon
v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1154 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Fifth
Circuit, Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d
709, 717 (5th Cir. 1976); Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1372-73, rehearing denied,
533 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1976); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891-98 (5th Cir. 1976)
(reprint of form); Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1975); Zaragoza v. City of
San Antonio, 464 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (W.D. Tex. 1979); Carter v. Telectron, 452 F.
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report to the bench, and distributes it to magistrates as part of
the training for which the Center is statutorily responsible."'
Thus, although the Judicial Conference has neither adopted the
Committee's recommendations nor endorsed the underlying
premises, 6 the report is an influential document warranting
thoughtful analysis.
The Aldisert Committee encourages districts with a heavy
prisoner caseload to delegate the complaints to their magis-
trates, and to adopt procedures and forms by local court rule.",
A special staff law clerk, or, preferably, a magistrate, would cen-
trally process a mandatory complaint form. s Most prisoners
request waiver of court fees;2' a required form would present the
prisoner's request to file in forma pauperis.80 The magistrate
Supp. 944, 948-51 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex.
1977); Eighth Circuit, Johnson v. Teadale, 456 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 (W.D. Mo. 1978);
Green v. Garrott, 71 F.R.D. 680, 683 (W.D. Mo. 1976). Other courts refer generally to
special forms for prisoners' use. Hughes v. Rowe, 101 S. Ct. 173, 175 (1980) (petitioner
filed section 1983 complaint in Northern District of Illinois on the form used by pro se
prisoners).
25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 620(b)(3), 637 (1976). The Federal Judicial Center conducts train-
ing programs for new magistrates within one year of their appointment.
26. On matters of policy, the Federal Judicial Center speaks only through its board.
Id. § 623 (1976). The Aldisert Committee has not submitted the final report to the Judi-
cial Conference for formal endorsement or adoption of the forms and procedures. Tele-
phone conversation with Alan J. Chaset, Assistant Director of Research and Staff to the
Prisoner Civil Rights Committee (Oct. 24, 1980). The Judicial Conference is continuing
the study of prisoner litigation through an ad hoc committee: Ninth Circuit Judge Good-
win, and district court judges Rubin (Southern District of Ohio) and Teitelbaum
(Western District of Pennsylvania).
27. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 45, 51-53. Forms include a complaint form;
declaration in support of request to proceed in forma pauperis; order to the court clerk
to file the complaint; order to the marshal to serve process; letter to a prisoner returning
communication mailed directly to a judge; order to plaintiff and defendant to file narra-
tive statement of the facts, witnesses, and exhibits; order requiring a special report by
prison officials; pretrial order. Id. at 87-106 (Recommended Forms).
28. Id. at 49-53.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Supp. 11 1978) (filing fee); id. § 1921 (1976) (marshals' fees
for service of process). In Turner's five-district sample, 85 to 95% of the prisoners filed
in forma pauperis. Turner, supra note 3, at 661 app. B. Any party may ask the court to
waive fees and costs. The federal pauper's statute provides in part:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution
or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who
makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affi-
ant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976). For discussion of screening these requests for waiver of fees
under the Aldisert procedures, see notes 84-104 infra and accompanying text.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976). ALDIERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 54-58, 93-94
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would grant or deny the request only on the basis of the pris-
oner's economic status31 Once the magistrate grants leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, the clerk would file the complaint.2
Magistrates would then decide whether process should issue, or
whether to recommend to the judge that the filed complaint be
dismissed before service of process on the defendant.33 The
plaintiff could object within ten days to the magistrate's recom-
mendation3 4 and the court would have discretion to permit
amendment of the complaint.3 5
If the complaint were not dismissed, the marshal would
serve process 6 and the court would mail the prisoner-petitioner
instructions to send copies of all future documents to the defen-
dant and to the clerk of the court.37 During pretrial, magistrates
would hear and decide any nondispositive motion. 3 Under the
Aldisert Committee recommendations, local court rules could
extend time periods for making and answering motions,39 as well
as limit discovery to a short period.4 0 The plaintiff would use a
form to summarize the anticipated testimony of his witnesses so
that the court could decide whether to go to the expense of
bringing a witness or the petitioner to the court.41 The court
could also use a special report form to discover defendant's ver-
sion of the facts.42
(Form 2).
31. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 54, 57-58.
32. Id. at 54, 58.
33. Id. at 59-63. The magistrate could report to the district court judge that the
complaint should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976). The in forma pauperis
statute states two grounds for dismissal: "The court may request an attorney to
represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."
Id.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976). ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 59.
35. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 60, 63.
36. Id. at 64, 97 (Form 4).
37. Id. at 64-65, 99 (Form 5). Letters to the judge or magistrate would be returned
with a form letter explaining the impropriety of such communication.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1976). The judge may reconsider pretrial orders that
are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id. The statute does not permit magistrates to
decide a dispositive motion (e.g., a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a
motion for summary judgment). Id. They may, however, submit findings of fact and rec-
ommendations to the district court judge, with copies to the parties, who may file written
objections. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C).
39. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 70.
40. Id. at 76-78, 101-02 (Form 6).
41. Id. at 77, 101-02 (Form 6).
42. Id. at 103-04 (Form 7). The defendant would file this form, an alternative or
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For the prisoner petitions not dismissed at the pleading and
motion stages, magistrates could determine that the difficulties
of a pretrial conference outweigh its benefits. In that case, they
would review the case file and prepare a pretrial order without
participation of the parties or their attorneys.4" If no appeal
were taken, the order would bind the parties in a subsequent
hearing.44 Magistrates could try the case, or serve as a special
master, if the parties consent.45 Alternatively, the magistrates
could conduct an evidentiary hearing and submit findings and
recommendations to the district court judge, who has broad
authority to reach his own decision.4
supplement to traditional discovery, along with his answer to the complaint, within a
time set at the court's discretion. Id. at 79-81. Unlike the forms required of the prisoner-
plaintiff, the defendant's Special Report need not be signed under penalty of perjury.
This recommended procedure may "give the court the benefit of detailed factual infor-
mation . . . involving a constitutional challenge to an important, complicated correc-
tional practice, particularly one that may affect more than the inmate who has filed the
1983 action." Id. at 79. However, the procedure also raises serious questions of a compro-
mised judicial role. The form authorizes the defendant to interview plaintiff and wit-
nesses before filing an answer, and authorizes medical or psychiatric examinations
"wherever appropriate." Id. at 104 (Form 7). The court's blanket permission to one party
could seriously infringe the rights of the other. Under the Federal Rules, for example,
the court requires a motion showing good cause and specific notice before it will permit a
physical or mental examination. FED. R. Crv. P. 35.
Several courts, however, have approved the special report practice. See, e.g., Mitch-
ell v. Beaubouef, 581 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1978) (but the unverified report cannot
serve as basis for summary judgment); Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978)
(equating use of procedure with the administrative law doctrine of primary jurisdiction);
Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1975) (Special Report notifies officials and
encourages informal settlement of grievance).
43. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 82-83, 105-06 (Form 8). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P.
16 ("[T]he court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before it for a conference . . . . The court shall make an order which recites the action
taken at the conference .... ").
44. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976); ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 83.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976); id. § 636(c) (Supp. III 1979); ALDISERT REPORT,
supra note 19, at 84-85. Appointment of a special master is appropriate under section
636 even if it would not meet the tests under the Federal Rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976). "The judge is given the widest discretion to
'accept, reject, or modify' the findings and recommendations proposed by the magistrate,
including the power to remand with instructions. Thus, . . . the ultimate adjudicatory
power over ... prisoner petitions.., is exercised by a judge of the court after receiving
assistance from and the recommendation of the magistrate." H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6162, 6171 [herein-
after cited as H.R. REP. No. 94-1609]. The Aldisert Committee incorrectly concludes that
the judge is to sustain the recommendation unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to
law. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 85-86.
University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 5:131
THE LIMITS ON COURTS' RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY
Because the Aldisert Committee recommends adoption of
procedures by local court rules, the first issue raised by the pre-
ceding overview is the scope of federal courts' rule-making
authority. Local district courts do have statutory authority to
make and amend rules by majority action of their judges.4
Those rules, however, must not be inconsistent with Acts of
Congress or with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4" nor may
procedural rules change any litigant's substantive rights49 or the
court's jurisdiction.50 The following analysis tests the recom-
mended procedures against these limits.
Analysis of Pleading Under the Aldisert Procedures
Several provisions in the proposed mandatory complaint
form"1 exceed the court's rule-making authority. Although the
report states that a prisoner's failure to conform to the local rule
requirements of this form would justify a court's refusal to file
the complaint,"' if the provisions are not valid, it is the prisoner,
rather than the court, who would be justified in rejecting the
complaint form.
A venue limitation is a clear example of a provision in the
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 provides:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time
to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with
these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court
shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976), sets limits on courts' rule-making authority: "The
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time
prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts
of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court." The
relevant rules of practice and procedure are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
49. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, authorized the Supreme Court
to prescribe general rules for the practice and procedure in all civil actions, with the
proviso that the "rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights
of any litigant." This limitation is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in pertinent part: "These rules shall not be construed
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of
actions therein."
51. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 89-92 (Form 1).
52. Id. at 51. The instructions on the recommended form emphasize: "The clerk will
not file your complaint unless it conforms to these instructions and to these forms." Id.
at 89. In the commentary, the Report states that, by local court rule, a complaint not on
the form but legible and complying with the rules of procedure can be accepted by the
clerk for filing. The Report does not reconcile these inconsistencies. Id. at 46.
Prisoner Civil Rights Complaints
recommended complaint form that conflicts with federal statute,
abridging a substantive right and modifying jurisdiction. The
complaint form instructs the prisoner-plaintiff that he may
bring his action in the court "only if one or more of the named
defendants is located within this district."5 8 This conflicts with
Congress' mandate that venue for claims arising under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States is proper in the district
in which the claim arose, as well as where all defendants reside."
Generally, prisoners bring suit in the district where they are
incarcerated because that is where a state employee allegedly
deprived them of a constitutional right. The venue statute would
not place a transferred or fired employee beyond the reach of
the prisoner-plaintiff, as would the Aldisert procedure. Because
a local rule cannot repeal the venue statute, the committee's rec-
ommendation is invalid.
The complaint form's affidavit requirement and special
pleading standards are examples of inconsistencies with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, not addressed by the Committee's
report, but of significant dimension. Under the recommended
procedure, the complainant must sign his pleading declaring,
under penalty of perjury, that the facts are correct.55 The Fed-
eral Rules, however, abolished a general affidavit requirement in
1938. 56 Under the Federal Rules, an attorney's signature on a
pleading means that "to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it."' 67 The resurrection
of the affidavit is especially unfortunate because it is coupled
with a fact pleading requirement. The mandatory complaint
form asks prisoners to declare the facts of the case in greater
detail than plaintiffs generally know at the pleading stage of
53. Id. at 89 (Form 1).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976). If defendants reside in different districts in the same
state, venue lies in any of those districts. Id. § 1392.
55. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 89, 92 (Form 1). The Report does not
acknowledge the inconsistency with Federal Rule 11. See notes 56 & 77 infra.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides in part: "A party who is not represented by an attor-
ney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically pro-
vided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit."
See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1335 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MI.LER], for a discussion of the verification requirement.
State practice is irrelevant; a specific federal statute or rule must require the affidavit
(e.g., petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1976); shareholder's derivative
suit complaint, FED. R. Cw. P. 23.1). Wright & Miller does not discuss requiring affidavit
by local court rule.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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their suits.58 This fact pleading standard is inconsistent with the
Federal Rules' "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief"59 giving the defendant
notice of the claim against him.60 The Aldisert recommendation
demands verified facts to facilitate trial by pleadings, because
the pleading information could be sufficient for the court "to
determine, in many cases, whether the complaint has merit
without requiring a responsive pleading from the defendant." '
By contrast, the Federal Rules expect development of the facts
and legal issues during discovery, pretrial conference, and hear-
ings on the merits.6 '
If the prisoner-petitioner clears the verification and fact
pleading hurdles, he faces other restrictions that do not appear
in the Federal Rules. Under the Aldisert procedures, for exam-
ple, he may not state all his separate complaints against the
defendant on one form.6" The Federal Rules, however, specifi-
cally encourage joining independent or alternate claims," and
58. The mandatory complaint form directs the prisoner: "Describe how each defen-
dant is involved. Include also the names of other persons involved, dates, and places. Do
not give any legal arguments or cite any cases or statutes." ALDISERT REPORT, supra note
19, at 92 (Form 1). Other parts of the form require facts about previous lawsuits and
recourse to prison grievance procedures. Id. at 90-91. Consistently with FED. R. CIv. P.
10, Form 1 requires the name of all parties and a statement of the relief sought. ALDIS-
-RT REPORT, supra note 19, at 92.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rules stress clear presentation by using a separate
paragraph to state a single set of circumstances. Id. 10(b). The Rules implicitly require
plaintiff to state some occurrence, transaction, or circumstance upon which he founds his
claim. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 56 at § 1215.
60. Charles Clark, a central figure in the drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, disliked the term "notice pleading," but affirmed the beneficial reform that
replaced detailed fact pleading with the requirement for a general statement. Clark,
Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177, 181 (1958). The uniform federal
pleading standard rescued litigants from the task of pleading "ultimate, material, opera-
tive facts" constituting their "cause of action," avoiding "evidentiary facts" or "conclu-
sions." C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 38 (2d ed. 1947).
61. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 54. See also id. at 46, 89-92 (Form 1).
62. The fact pleading versus notice pleading controversy surrounded promulgation
and adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, and resurfaced in 1955 when the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts rejected an amendment to Rule 8(a)(2). 12 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 56, at 591-92 app. F (1973). The language of the proposal required "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which
statement shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE JUDGES OF THE NINTH Cmcurr, CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253
(1952) (emphasis added) (discussion on the need for amendment of Federal Rule
8(a)(2)).
63. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 89 (Instructions to Form 1).
64. FED. R. Civ, P. 18(a).
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permit pleading alternate, hypothetical, or inconsistent claims,
on legal or equitable grounds.68 Because the prisoner must pre-
pare multiple, identical copies of the lengthy complaint form, an
instruction that he must repeat the project for each claim not
related to the same incident or issue not only conflicts with pro-
cedure under the Federal Rules, but also deters the speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action that liberal joinder
rules promote.
Practical problems generated the imposition of special
pleading rules for one class of cases, but cannot justify solutions
that conflict with federal law. Typically, prisoner-plaintiffs come
to the court without attorney representation (pro se).66 Court
personnel face complaints that they characterize as "exasperat-
ing, frequently disrespectful, sometimes trivial, and often with-
out legal merit. ' 67 The Aldisert Committee, therefore, proposed
the complaint form for the pro se litigant whose pleading
"would otherwise be vague, verbose, and incomprehensible.6 8
Prolix and illegible pro se pleadings may, in fact, be the excep-
tion rather than the rule.69 An empirical study of prisoner cases
70found that the pleadings were mostly typewritten and concise.
Even if the pleaded complaints are unattractive, however, dis-
criminatory handling by some courts is an unfortunate prece-
dent in a uniform judicial system. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has given clear direction that lower courts should not
65. Id. 8(e). The plaintiff raising inconsistent claims faces a dilemma because he can
not attest to the truth of his facts as the Aldisert Report requires. See notes 55-62 supra
and accompanying text, discussing the affidavit and perjury requirements.
66. Federal statute permits parties to plead and conduct their cases without counsel.
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976). Attorneys rarely file these complaints. The range of attorney
participation was 0 to 22% in Turner's five districts in 1978. Turner, supra note 3, at 661
app. B.
67. Memorandum from Judge James E. Doyle, Western District of Wisconsin, to the
Chief Justice of the United States and the Judicial Conference of the United States
(March 4, 1975), quoted in Turner, supra note 3, at 617 n.46. Judge Doyle is an articu-
late advocate of recognition of prisoners' constitutional rights. See Morales v. Schmidt,
340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis.) (Doyle, J.), rev'd, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973); Doyle, The
Court's Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JUDICATuRE 406 (1973).
68. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 46.
69. An example from the case law is the 24 page, handwritten complaint in Gamble
v. Estelle, 516 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), on
remand, 554 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1977). The literature generally assumes that pro se com-
plaints are prolix and illegible. See, e.g., ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 12.
70. Turner observed that most of the 644 case files he reviewed contained typed,
legible, and relatively short pleadings. Turner, supra note 3, at 617 n.46.
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reject any pleading for technical deficiencies." Courts apply this
standard to all cases, whether they be antitrust actions72 or pris-
oner complaints.7 Courts must construe pro se pleadings liber-
ally so as to do substantial justice.14
Furthermore, judicial self-help is unnecessary because legiti-
mate methods exist to manage the practical problems of pro se
pleadings. Judges can screen the pleadings using the Federal
Rules themselves, rather than resort to special standards whose
adoption is of questionable validity. On its own initiative, in all
civil actions under the Federal Rules, the court may strike from
pleadings any matter that is "redundant, immaterial, imperti-
nent, or scandalous."7 Although the court should not dismiss
prisoners' (or any other) complaints unless assured "beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief, '76 the court should
require that complaints meet two threshhold standards set out
in the Federal Rule requiring that the party or his attorney sign
the pleading.7 7 The first standard is that, to the best knowledge,
information, or belief of the signer, there are good grounds to
71. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Haines reversed an Illinois district court's
dismissal, on defendant's motion, of a 60 year old prisoner's pro se complaint that he was
placed in solitary confinement without a hearing and suffered physical injury. He was
entitled to an opportunity to offer proof, although his allegations were inartfully pleaded.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), states that courts should not dismiss a complaint
unless assured "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 45-46. It has been suggested that this
is not so much a precise test as an evocation of an attitude toward the function of plead-
ing in the federal procedural scheme. F. JAMEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE 86-88 (1965).
72. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978).
73. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) states: "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substan-
tial justice." A pro se complaint should be held to "less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
76. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 requires in part:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed .... A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state
his address .... The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose
of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed
as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilfull violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action
may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
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support the pleading. The second is that the pleading should not
be interposed for delay. The court may strike the entire pleading
if it fails to meet these standards. Rule 11 also permits the court
to discipline an unscrupulous, irresponsible lawyer for willful
violation of pleading standards. By analogy, a person who acts as
his own attorney should also be subject to the court's inherent
power to control proceedings.78
In addition to these provisions for judicial oversight of the
pleadings, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide
other mechanisms for the parties to eliminate inappropriate
issues. Defendants can protect themselves from an incomprehen-
sible or vague pleading by moving for a more definite state-
ment,79  or to strike redundant or immaterial matters.80  By
motion, or in the answer, the defendant can seek dismissal of the
prisoner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted."1 The defendant can answer and simulta-
neously move for judgment on the pleadings.82 Summary judg-
78. The disciplinary language refers to attorneys, not pro se litigants. A draft of the
Rules provided that an unrepresented party "shall sign the pleadings and shall be sub-
ject to the obligations and penalties herein prescribed for attorneys." 5 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 56, at § 1331 n.6. Although this language was dropped, logic suggests
that the purpose and effect of the Rule is intended to extend to unrepresented parties,
although recognizing that the court has a substantive disciplinary relationship with
attorneys different from its authority over litigants. A proposed amendment of Rule 11
would make this explicit:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed primarily for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause delay, or to increase the cost of
litigation.. . . If a pleading is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own inititative, shall impose upon the person who signed it,
a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 90 F.R.D. 451, 462-63 (1981).
Courts have, in fact, disciplined pro se litigants who have abused the standards of
Rule 11. See In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1978); Carter v. Telectron, 452 F. Supp.
944 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (multiple filings, forgery of proof of service and defendant's answer;
plaintiff enjoined from future proceedings in court in forma pauperis).
79. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(e).
80. Id. 12(0.
81. Id. 12(b)(6).
82. Id. 12(c).
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ment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of
law,"3 although this motion will almost certainly involve the par-
ties in some discovery and filing of affidavits.
Analysis of the Screening of Complaints Under the Aldisert
Procedures
Because the prisoner-plaintiff usually requests waiver of
court fees,8 ' court action granting or denying the in forma
pauperis petition precedes the filing of his complaint. The two
statutory grounds for dismissal of a case at this stage are an
untrue allegation of poverty, or a frivolous or malicious action.8 5
The statutory description of the in forma pauperis privilege 6 is
ambiguous and courts have not clarified either the mechanics or
the standard. A study of prisoner complaints revealed that all
district courts used the statute to screen and dismiss cases ex
parte, but that the screening practices were not uniform and
were seldom published for the information of the litigant or
counsel.87
The Aldisert Committee recommends a two-step screening
process of section 1983 complaints filed in forma pauperis.88
The first step is a magistrate's decision to file the complaint,
based on the economic status of the petitioner.8 9 This standard
conforms to the in forma pauperis statute, giving courts discre-
tion to waive fees when a person "makes affidavit that he is
unable to pay such costs or give security therefor."' 0 Under the
Recommended Procedures, completion of this first step is insuf-
83. Id. 56(c).
84. In Turner's sample, in forma pauperis filings ranged from 85 to 95%. Turner,
supra note 3, at 661 app. B.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976) (text at note 33 supra).
86. Id. § 1915(a) (text at note 29 supra). The statutory language permits, but does
not obligate, a court to waive fees. Indigents do not have a constitutional right of access
to civil courts, although Justices Douglas and Brennan have argued the right under an
equal protection analysis. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385-86, 388-89 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring in result, and Brennan, J., concurring in part). The Boddie
plaintiffs sought a divorce. The Court held that, under a due process analysis, states may
not bar indigents from court when the state monopolizes the means for legal dissolution
of marriage. Id. at 374.
87. Turner, supra note 3, at 618.
88. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 59-63, 93-97 (Forms 2-4).
89. Id. at 54, 57-58.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976). Congress raised the filing fee from $15 to $60 in 1978.
Id. § 1914(a) (Supp. II 1978).
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ficient to commence a section 1983 action even if the magistrate
grants the in forma pauperis petition and orders filing of the
complaint. In the second step, the magistrate can still recom-
mend to the judge the simultaneous dismissal of the complaint
without service of process on the defendant.9 1
This second step conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and places a new burden on the courts. Under the
Federal Rules, service of process is not discretionary.92 Once a
complaint is filed with the court, a civil action commences9" and
"the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver it for
service to the marshal . . . .- Service of process requires no
affirmative act by the judge. If the flood of prisoner cases threat-
91. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 59-63. The Aldisert Committee believes this
is the best procedure when the magistrate concludes that the complaint is frivolous or
malicious after reading the prisoner's pleading. The two-step process seems little differ-
ent from the practice, criticized by the Aldisert Report, of denying leave to proceed in
forma pauperis not only on the ground that the allegation of poverty is untrue, but also
on the ground that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id. at 57-58. See Wartman v.
Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, Milwaukee County, Wis., 510 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.
1975).
The prison law literature does not acknowledge the critical effect of filing in forma
pauperis. The American Civil Liberties Union, for example, states: "Sometimes .. .
[U.S. Marshal's] fees amount to $75.00-$100.00 and this is why it is wise to proceed in
forma pauperis, even if you have money in your prison account." J. POTTS, PRISONERS'
SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL 9 (1976). A prisoner should try to pay court fees to avoid
premature dismissal of the complaint. A petition accompanied by the filing fee would not
be screened before service of process on the defendant. See Turner, supra note 3, at 618.
92. See FED. R. Civ. P; 4(a). This unstartling observation is, nonetheless, a subject
of disagreement among the circuits. Compare Nichols v. Schubert, 499 F.2d 946 (7th Cir.
1974) (requiring immediate service of process) with Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973). The Nichols court stated that there is "no
reason for circumventing the mandate of Rule 4(a) ...simply because the matter pro-
ceeded in forma pauperis. Such cases must proceed through the adversary system with
live defendants properly served as in all other cases." 499 F.2d at 947. The Jones court,
however, found the Federal Rules "inadequate to protect the courts . ..from frivolous
litigation from indigent prisoners." 58 F.R.D. at 463. "Frivolous" refers to "an action in
which the plaintiff's realistic chances of ultimate success are slight." Id. at 464. The
Supreme Court has rejected this standard, at least with regard to recovery of attorneys'
fees when a prisoner's action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith." Hughes v. Rowe, 101 S. Ct. 173, 178 (1980)
(citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1980)). "The plaintiff's
action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation. The
fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification
for the assessment of fees." 101 S. Ct. at 178.
93. FED. R. CIv. P. 3 states: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court."
94. Id. 4(a). The in forma pauperis statute also uses mandatory language: "The
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such
cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1976).
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ens efficient judicial administration, as the Committee premises,
it is illogical to recommend that the court undertake an addi-
tional job. The Aldisert recommendation to dismiss in forma
pauperis petitions prior to service of process seeks to spare the
defendant the expense and inconvenience of answering a merit-
less complaint.5 By intercepting service of process, however, dis-
trict courts cut off the operation of the multiple options avail-
able to a harassed defendant under the Federal Rules." If
served, the defendant will have notice of the claim and may
choose to attempt to resolve the problem within the prison, to
seek dismissal of the action, or to litigate. When the court inter-
poses procedural steps to shield state employees from perceived
harassment, the judiciary adds to its own burdens by shoulder-
ing decisions which the adversary system allocates to the parties.
In addition, the two-step screening procedure and the mag-
istrate's recommendation for dismissal of the complaint before
service of process appear to exceed the scope of magistrates'
authority. The statutory language and congressional intent of
the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act 97 indicate
that magistrates should hold hearings, including evidentiary
hearings, on section 1983 complaints before recommending dis-
position.98 Magistrates hear, but are foreclosed from determin-
ing, dispositive pretrial matters such as motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
95. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 59. The Report apparently agrees that
"indigents, unlike other litigants, approach the courts in a context where they have noth-
ing to lose and everything to gain." Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972),
aff'd, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973). This perspective ignores a viable counter analysis: the
"cost" to the prisoner-plaintiff is the threat of retaliation by those who control his envi-
ronment. This possibility is not hypothetical. In drafting the Civil Rights of Instutional-
ized Persons Act, Congress mandated safeguards to avoid reprisals as an essential ele-
ment in a prison grievance resolution system. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1997d, 1997e(b)(2)(D)
(West Supp. 1974-80). See notes 118-24 infra and accompanying text.
96. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
97. Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
(1976)).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976), states in part: "[A] judge may also designate a
magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge
of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a
judge of the court, . . . of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement." The
authority under this section "is clearly more than authority to make a 'preliminary
review.' It is the authority to conduct hearings and where necessary to receive evidence
relevant to the issues involved in these matters." H.R. REP. No. 94-1609, supra note 46,
at 11, [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6171.
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motions to dismiss an action involuntarily." By analogy, in
forma pauperis dismissal of a prisoner's filed complaint before
service of process on the defendant should also be precluded.
Congress expanded magistrates' jurisdiction, in part, to give
prisoners prompt access to an officer of the court. 100 The statute
defines that access as a hearing, not, as the Aldisert Committee
recommends, as an ex parte judgment on the pleadings.
Thus, like the mandatory complaint form, the recom-
mended screening procedure exceeds the limits of courts'
authority to act under local rules. 101 The procedural approach
recommended by the Aldisert Committee also undermines the
uniformity and purposes of procedure in federal courts. Further-
more, the Federal Rules already provide several responses to the
difficulties characteristic of state prisoner civil rights actions.
Shielding defendants by dismissing section 1983 complaints
before service of process, therefore, is both inherently inefficient
and compromises the judicial role.10 2
The screening procedure may be criticized on constitutional
grounds as well. Two Texas prisoners brought a class action
challenging the methods by which the court refers the in forma
pauperis petition to a magistrate for screening.103 They alleged
as much as twenty-one month intervals between the complaint
and the filing. The circuit court reversed the lower court's dis-
missal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, and agreed that substantially different treatment of
indigent and non-indigent litigants stated a claim under the due
process and equal protection clauses. It remanded the case to
consider the question of the court's discretion not to issue
process.10M
99. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1976).
100. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act: Hearings on S. 1283
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1975) (statement of Judge Metzner for the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
101. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
102. A Ninth Circuit judge observed that screening the in forma pauperis petition
for the peripheral question of frivolousness forces decision-makers to be "both inquisi-
tors, to protect the revenue and the possible victims of vexatious suits, and advocates, to
protect the poor litigant." Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L.
REv. 1270, 1284 (1966). •
103. Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 1333-34. Nine months later, the district court denied plaintiff Carter's
pauper status, and ultimately dismissed him from the suit for failure to pay fees. Proce-
dural history noted in Carter v. Telectron, 452 F. Supp. 944, 977 (S.D. Tex. 1977). The
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LEGITIMIZING THE ALDISERT COMMITTEE'S PROCEDURES
The analyses of the Aldisert Committee's complaint form,
pleading standards, and screening and dismissal procedure dis-
close conflicts with statutes, with the uniform Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and with Supreme Court direction. Because
courts may not adopt or amend rules inconsistent with the law
or the Federal Rules, adopting the proposals by local court rule
would exceed judicial authority. If Congress enacted the Aldisert
proposals as statutory rules, that demerit would be remedied. 10 5
Three reasons caution against congressional enactment of
the Aldisert procedures. The first, discussed in the preceding
analyses, is that the Federal Rules and relevant statutes are
appropriate tools to deal with many of the concerns which
prompted the Aldisert proposals. Second, the Committee has
not measured the efficiency of the proposals. Third, the Com-
mittee has sidestepped a fundamental question: defining the
standard by which courts will determine that a complaint is friv-
olous or malicious. Congressional enactment would legitimize
the procedures, but would not cure these defects in the Report.
The Aldisert Committee's goals are judicial administrative
efficiency and fairness in individual cases.106 The goal of proce-
dural rules in federal courts is "the just, speedy, and inexpensive
court did not deal with the question on remand. The constitutional question has merit,
but unfortunately it was raised by a plaintiff with a history of abuse of court processes.
When a records-search showed 178 actions characterized by forgery and perjury, the
court enjoined Carter from future proceedings in forma pauperis unless able to satisfy
the court that he acted for good cause. Id.
105. The Supreme Court promulgated and Congress enacted procedural rules and
model (but not mandatory) forms for habeas corpus actions, responding to some of the
same difficulties characteristic of state prisoner civil rights complaints. RULES GOVERNING
SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1976 & Supp. III 1979) (effective Feb. 1, 1977)).
In a 1973 article expressing concern about the federal courts' handling of section
1983 cases and the "drift towards a national court system," Judge Aldisert acknowledged
that procedural reforms restricting the scope of section 1983 should come from Congress.
Aldisert, supra note 9, at 571.
Assuming that Congress may be persuaded to act, a state prisoner should, at
the very least, be required to identify by name the person he alleges deprived
him of his constitutional rights. Prisoners should also be required to set forth
factual allegations of the deprivations. Rather than going to the extremes of
Haines v. Kerner [404 U.S. 519 (1972)], a special type of pleading similar to
that employed by Pennsylvania practice should be required in civil pro se pris-
oner cases instead of allowing the more liberal standards of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted).
106. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 2, 7-28.
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determination of every action. 10 7 Ascertaining whether prac-
tices contribute to meeting these goals requires measurement.
On their face, the Aldisert procedures would seem to prolong the
adjudicatory process, because the court must initiate and evalu-
ate eight forms, in effect conducting its own discovery and
motions practice. Prior court experience with procedural stream-
lining cautions that procedural changes often escalate costs, or
simply do not produce the expected results; the liberal discovery
rules are an example of the former, 0 8 and pretrial conferences
demonstrate the latter. 09
Another relevant measurement is the effect on other levels
of the judiciary if district courts implement procedures designed
to affect their own caseload. A statistical reduction in the trial
court's work is illusory if the cases simply reappear in the Court
of Appeals. Over ten percent of the appeals filed in federal
courts are state prisoner section 1983 cases,"10 and the number
has doubled in the last two years."' Many appeals challenge
procedural rulings rather than seek review of the merits, leading
circuit courts to criticize precipitous dismissal of viable prisoner
complaints.1 2 The increasing burden on the appellate courts
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
108. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 389-93
(1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. See M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 67-70
(1964).
110. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 46 (Table 4) (11.5%).
111. Id. at 45 (Table 3); 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 46 (Table 4). This
category of appeals from district courts jumped from 753 cases in 1978 to 1578 cases in
1980. The circuits are not equally affected. In 1980, more than one in three appeals in
the Fourth Circuit, but less than one in one hundred in the District of Columbia Circuit,
were state prisoner section 1983 cases. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 46 (Table
4).
112. The "defendants" in Lewis v. State, 547 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976), refused to par-
ticipate in the appellate proceeding because they had not been served with process in an
action brought by a prisoner alleging removal of funds from his prison commissary
account. The District Court for the Northern District of New York had granted leave to
file in forma pauperis, and simultaneously dismissed for failure to state a constitutional
claim. "Untimely dismissal may prove wasteful of the court's limited resources rather
than expeditious, for it often leads to a shuttling of the lawsuit between the district and
appellate courts." Id. at 6. The Second Circuit vacated the order of dismissal and
remanded for service of process. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed:
[P]recipitous dismissal may only add the expense and inconvenience of appel-
late litigation to whatever burden appropriate development of the case at the
trial level might entail. The exhumation and resurrection of viable prisoner
complaints which have been summarily given final rites and buried by district
courts has become a major occupation of this court.
Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1976). The court, however, did not
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may indicate the failure of district court strategies to stem the
flow of prisoner suits by using local rules to facilitate ex parte
dismissals.
Reducing the number of prisoner petitions in the federal
district court could affect other parts of the governmental struc-
ture as well. Any analysis of the prisoner civil rights petition
phenomenon should acknowledge that problems in prisons gen-
erate the complaints, " and that reducing the district court
caseload does not eliminate the problems. Indeed, if prisoners
find that courts set up barriers to petitioning for redress of con-
stitutional deprivations, they may be more likely to resort to vio-
lent grievance resolution tactics.1 14 The costs of one prison riot
surely exceed the cost of innumerable section 1983 complaints.
Analysts should scrutinize procedure at the district court level in
terms of its apparent or foreseeable impact on other parts of the
judicial or administrative structure.
The third reason to caution against congressional validation
of the Aldisert Committee procedures is their failure to define
the "frivolous or malicious" standard against which magistrates
would measure the merits of a complaint. Merely specifying who
will handle what required form when still leaves judicial per-
sonnel and prisoner litigants without guidance about a crucial
determination: how. The Aldisert Committee should have
defined the frivolous or malicious standard, rather than avoiding
it as "a question of substantive law and therefore beyond the
scope of these procedures.' 15 Just as the court will not dismiss
require filing of responsive pleadings. The court can elicit the record supporting dismis-
sal solely from the plaintiff prisoner. Id. at 1373 n.19.
113. See Turner, supra note 3, at 628. Turner analyzes several factors affecting the
volume of prisoner litigation: prison population, prison conditions and rules, substantive
law, receptivity of individual judges, change of prison administration or policy, avail-
ability of administrative remedies, jailhouse lawyering activity, availability of legal assis-
tance, prison riots or disturbances. Id. at 625-37.
114. "Underlying most recent major prison riots . . . were festering, unanswered
grievances. Rioting prisoners repeatedly lament that, under normal circumstances, no
one will listen to their complaints or that, once heard, their grievances are ignored." M.
KEATING, IMPROVED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 28 (1976). The investigators of the New
Mexico State Penitentiary riot (Feb. 2-3, 1980) stressed that prison policies had "'under-
mined inmates' self-interest in keeping order and disrupted the non-violent power
sources of convict leaders.'" N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1980, § A, at 12, col. 1.
115. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 60. Almost half the Supreme Court docket
is filed in forma pauperis (in the 1979 October term, 2249 cases as compared with 2509
paid cases, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1 at A-i). Nonetheless, no uniform stan-
dard of "frivolous or malicious" guides the lower courts. Anders v. California, a criminal
case, uses a frequently cited guideline: a contention is not frivolous if "any of the legal
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on defendant's motion unless "it appears 'beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to
relief,' "116 so the court should not dismiss a prisoner's claim as
"frivolous" unless statute or controlling precedent forecloses the
pleading, liberally construed.11 7 Local courts should not be
encouraged to devise their own tests, or to dismiss cases on the
basis of unarticulated standards.
The problems addressed by the Aldisert Committee
urgently require both state and federal legislative consideration.
However, congressional implementation of the Committee's pro-
cedural solution to the prisoner civil rights petition phenomenon
would be shortsighted, particularly without measurement of
impacts and without articulation of a substantive standard for
dismissal of frivolous actions. Perhaps the Federal Judicial
Center is equipped to conduct these investigations. In the
meantime, seeking to lighten federal court burdens by singling
out prisoner section 1983 suits for different treatment described
in locally adopted rules not only destroys the uniformity and
predictability of federal procedure, but also exceeds authority
granted to courts. Courts should abjure the proposed solution,
and avoid creating a lamentable precedent. Concerned judges
need not be passive, however. Congressional actions suggest
some alternative directions.
ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS FOR COURT RESPONSE TO PRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS PETITIONS
Deferring to the Institutional Remedy
The Ninety-sixth Congress created a limited exhaustion of
remedies requirement under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act."1 ' A federal court may continue a section 1983 case
for up to ninety days to require exhaustion of "such plain,
speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are avail-
points are arguable on their merits." 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). In Hughes v. Rowe, 101 S.
Ct. 173, 178 (1980), the Court rejected the idea that losing the case proves it was
meritless.
116. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957)).
117. Turner urged an explicit legal standard. "Neither judicial efficiency nor the
cause of individual justice is served by leaving those who read complaints without clear
guidance." Turner, supra note 3, at 649.
118. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 (West
Supp. 1974-80)).
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able."11 9 The continuance is proper only if the United States
Attorney General certifies, or the court determines, that the
grievance resolution mechanism meets stringent minimum stan-
dards:120 an advisory role for inmates and employees, specific
time limits for written replies to grievances, priority handling of
emergency grievances, safeguards to avoid reprisals, and inde-
pendent review. 11 Judges concerned about their section 1983
caseload, therefore, can determine whether the correctional facil-
ities in their district have acceptable grievance mechanisms. The
prisoner's interest is protected because the federal court would
retain jurisdiction; if the complaint were not addressed and
resolved during the ninety day continuance, the court action
would commence. 122 Further, if the complaint alleges imminent
danger to life, or raises issues which the grievance resolution sys-
tem probably could not resolve, the court would forego the pro-
cedure in the interests of justice. 23 Judicial interest in deferring
to an institutional remedy could go far to encourage creation of
effective resolution systems in the prisons.12 '
Compensating Counsel
To many commentators, the appointment and compensa-
tion of counsel is the most crucial element in meeting judicial
needs for efficient case management, and litigants' needs to
press meritorious complaints to a successful conclusion. When
119. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a)(1) (West Supp. 1974-80). "The almost 10,000 prisoner
suits brought to court in 1978 are swamping our judges. Many of these complaints are
pro se and often poorly drafted in terms of presenting the problem in a legal context.
Requiring the exhaustion of in-prison grievances should resolve some cases thereby
reducing the total number and help frame the issues in the remaining cases so as to
make them ready for expeditious court consideration." S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1979), reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 787, 816 [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 96-416].
120. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,095 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. part 40).
121. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(b)(2)(A)-(E) (West Supp. 1974-80). The court may request
information from the United States Attorney General on the grievance process certifica-
tion status of a prison. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,098 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 40.22).
122. The standards set a maximum time limit of 90 days from initiation to disposi-
tion. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,097 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 40.7(e)).
123. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a)(1) (West Supp. 1974-80). See S. REP. No. 96-416, supra
note 119, at 34, [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 817.
124. The Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures describe many forms of relief:
"monetary remedies, restitution of property, reclassification, correction of records, per-
sonnel actions, agreement by institutional officials to remedy an objectionable condition
within a reasonable, specified time, and a change in an institution policy or practice." 45
Fed. Reg. 79,096 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 40.6).
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the prisoner is on his own, relying on his intuitive sense of
injury, his prison law library for substantive legal principles, his
own skill, or an inmate "writ writer" for procedural guidance, 26
the court loses the benefit of counsel's screening the nonjusti-
ciable controversy or mediating an out-of-court settlement.
Absence of counsel also deprives the court of the professionally
crafted working papers to which it is accustomed. For judicial
efficiency, no section 1983 case should be prosecuted pro se.1 26 In
terms of fairness, analysis of the cases demonstrates that pro se
prisoner litigants in federal courts do not make full use of pre-
trial discovery, move their cases to trial, or receive the relief
they request.1 7
The in forma pauperis statute, so crucial to prisoner liti-
gants, gives courts discretion to "request" that an attorney
represent an indigent petitioner, '2 8 but it does not provide for
award of fees. '29 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of
1976,130 however, does authorize reasonable fees to the prevailing
125. The state may not bar mutual help between prisoners if no alternative legal aid
is available to assist poorly educated inmates in writing petitions for post-conviction
relief. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). "It is indisputable that prison 'writ writers'
like petitioner are sometimes a menace to prison discipline and that their petitions are
often so unskillful as to be a burden on the courts which receive them." Id. at 488. For
varying perspectives on writ-writing, see Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ-Writing, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 371 (1968); Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, id. at 343; Spector,
A Prison Librarian Looks at Writ-Writing, id. at 365.
126. Duniway, supra note 102 passim. For an historical review, see Note, Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1326-27, 1329 & n.51 (1966). The
writer urges screening by an impartial panel of the bar, followed by appointment of
counsel for meritorious claims. Id. at 1337-38, 1337 n.94.
127. In Turner's 644-case sample, only 4 pro se plaintiffs successfully used the dis-
covery procedures available under the Federal Rules, and fewer still got any results. The
court awarded 12 temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions on 286 appli-
cations. Three injunctions and two damage awards issued in 664 cases. One pro se plain-
tiff obtained an award, for $6. Turner, supra note 3, at 624-25. No pro se plaintiff had a
hearing or trial. Id. at 663 app. B.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976).
129. On the other hand, the Criminal Justice Act authorizes appointment and com-
pensation of counsel in habeas corpus actions. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976). That section
should be amended to extend it to civil rights actions. Turner, supra note 3, at 651.
For discussion of appointment and compensation of counsel, see I. SENSENICH, supra
note 2, at 22-37, Supp. at 5-8; ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 12-16, 14 n.26.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The Act states: "In any action or proceeding to enforce
a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 of this title . . . the court, in its
discretion, may award the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs." Fees are an integral part of the section 1983 remedy
whether the plaintiff brings the action in federal or state court. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 11 (1980).
Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 with the inten-
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party in an action to enforce section 1983. Congress intended to
increase the availability of counsel, and federal judges could
publicize their interest in utilizing the statute to promote partic-
ipation by counsel in these cases.
Utilizing Magistrates
Some of the complexities of prisoner litigation identified by
the Aldisert Committee derive from the fact of incarceration.
How does a prisoner-petitioner, or his witness, get to court?
Who pays, and who is responsible for security? " " Congress cre-
ated a lower tier of judicial officers, magistrates, to provide the
flexible and economical support for district court judges13 2 faced
with just such dilemmas. Magistrates, for example, can travel to
a correctional institution to conduct a hearing, supervise discov-
ery, or hold a pretrial conference "3 and since 1979, they may
also conduct trials upon the consent of the parties. 3 4
Congress expanded magistrates' jurisdiction in part to
"expedite prisoner litigation in the district courts and give pris-
oners prompt access to a competent judicial officer.' 3  Judges
can utilize their magistrates as the statute explicitly provides: to
tion of increasing the availability of counsel. Availability of counsel will not be a pan-
acea. When civil legal services have been available, as in Washington State, the negative
attitude of prisoners toward the legal system has been the most important variable in
their decision to use or avoid the resource. For an empirical study, see Alpert, The
Determinants of Prisoner Decisions to Seek Legal Aid, 4 NEw ENG. J. PRIsoN L. 309
(1978).
131. In Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1977), the court ordered shared
state and federal responsibility. For discussion of the complexities of the judicial process
when litigants and witnesses are incarcerated, see ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at
16-17, 19 n.34.
132. Congressional expansion of the role and jurisdiction of magistrates is one of the
major developments in the judiciary in the last decade. See McCabe, The Federal
Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. LEGis. 343 (1979). Magistrates replaced the part-
time, nonprofessional, service-for-fees Commissioners in 1968 as a lower tier of judicial
officers. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968). Congress
expanded magistrates' jurisdiction in 1976 and 1979. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-577, 90 Stat. 2729; Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643.
The magistrate provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1976). Judges can also appoint magistrates to serve as
Special Masters. Id. § 636(b)(2).
134. Id. § 636(c)(1)-(7) (Supp. III 1979). Magistrates may conduct jury or nonjury
civil trials upon the consent of the parties made voluntarily at the time the action is
filed. Judgment is appealable directly to the appropriate circuit court. Id. § 636(c)(2)-(3).
135. 1975 Hearings, supra note 100, at 36. See also S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-4, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1469, 1472 [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 96-74].
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conduct evidentiary hearings in prisoner conditions of confine-
ment cases, and to present findings of fact and recommendations
for disposition to the district court judge.1"6 An extremely heavy
prisoner caseload would justify a judicial request for appoint-
ment of additional magistrates." 7 Increased use of magistrates
serves both the interest of judicial efficiency and individual fair-
ness. The magistrate's recommendations, and the judge's dis-
positive ruling, would be based on evidence presented at a hear-
ing, possibly at the prison, rather than, as is now predominantly
the case, based on the magistrate's ex parte judgment of the
pleading.
Expanding Concurrent State Court Jurisdiction
The federal courts' contemporary response to prisoner cases
should be read against the historical background of federal judi-
cial deference to a state executive's authority to set penal objec-
tives and provide for penal security within the limits of the
resources allocated by state legislatures. The traditional "hands
off" policy gave way in the 1960's and 1970's as courts recog-
nized prisoners' substantive constitutional rights, but the under-
lying concerns for federalism and separation of powers
remain. s
Expanded participation by state courts in hearing section
1983 complaints would not only alleviate the district court
136. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976). The 1976 amendments authorized magistrates
to conduct evidentiary hearings in prisoners' conditions of confinement cases, and to
present findings of fact and recommendations for disposition to the district court judge,
who, constitutionally, retains jurisdiction although delegating duties to the magistrate.
137. Id. §§ 631, 633. The Judicial Conference surveys districts to determine num-
bers and locations of magistrates. District court judges appoint magistrates for an eight
year term. See S. REP. No. 96-74, supra note 135, at 4, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1472.
138. Professor Christina Whitman concludes that federal court section 1983 actions
inevitably displace state authority.
The displacement occurs simply because when an interest is granted constitu-
tional protection, the existence or nonexistence of state law becomes, in large
measure, irrelevant. Whatever choice a state has previously adopted -
whether it be to provide or to withhold protection - is preempted simply
because a plaintiff will usually pursue the federal remedy. The displacement is
particularly insidious because there is no explicit decision that state perform-
ance is inadequate, and, thus, no clear signal to the states that their power is
being eroded.
Whitman, supra note 11, at 30. See also Symposium on "State Courts and Federalism
in the 1980's", 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 599 (1981); Aldisert, id. at 821; Aldisert, supra
note 9, at 557.
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caseload, but would also diminish the tensions inherent in fed-
eral judicial oversight of state institutions. When Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, it placed exclusive jurisdic-
tion in federal courts.3 9 In codifying the act several years later,
Congress dropped that language. 4 0 The Supreme Court has
reserved the question whether state courts must accept section
1983 actions, but has held that Congress has not barred them
from doing so.141 There is no statutory or implied preclusion of
concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction, as appellate
courts in nearly half the states recognize.14 2
CONCLUSION
The volume and characteristics of prisoner civil rights cases
exacerbate the strain on finite judicial resources. Judicial self-
help in the form of local court rules is an inappropriate
response. Singling out prisoners' suits under the Civil Rights Act
for treatment different from other civil plaintiffs undermines the
uniformity and purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action. The special procedures analyzed in this Comment, such
as a complaint form in conflict with both rule and statute, fact
pleading under penalty of perjury, and service of process at the
discretion of the court, are not just. They impede the speedy
determination of the prisoner's civil action by delaying, and
most likely denying, a hearing on the merits. Furthermore, the
procedures by local rule probably do not promote the inexpen-
sive determination of the action, measured either by dollars or
by the use of judicial resources: the court's stance as shield to
the defendant not only delays the case, but also creates a new
district court burden, and increases the likelihood of appellate
review of the ex parte dismissal.
Judicial willingness to inquire into penal practices and con-
ditions in the last two decades has redressed individual injuries,
initiated widespread reform, and heightened the efforts of
administrators to implement objectively rational practices
139. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, provided for "such proceeding
to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States ....
140. U.S. REV. STAT. §§ 563(12), 629(16) (1873-74).
141. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
142. As of January, 1980, twenty-three state appellate courts recognized state court
jurisdiction over section 1983 actions. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 19, at 107-14 app.
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within the authoritarian society of the prison.4 The decisions of
the past decades, however, are not assurances of constitutional
rights if local rules of procedure bar the prisoner-petitioner from
federal court.
Gay Gellhorn
143. Court decisions redressing constitutional injuries are discussed at notes 3-8
supra. Even losing cases lead to positive change. Turner, supra note 3, at 639 & nn.146-
48. Some cases have had broad impact. Widespread reform is clearly the aim of a case
like Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), addressing systemic failures
of the Rhode Island prisons. New Hampshire decided to act before the courts intervened.
Mesmer, Bourdan & Foley, Constitutional Guidelines for New Hampshire County Jails
and Houses of Correction, 4 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 83 (1977). The Texas legislature
established its Commission on Jail Standards "due to increasing pressure from Federal
Courts acting on law suits that have so far targeted facilities and treatment of prisoners
in 20 Texas jails. Only 6 of 254 counties have jails meeting State health department
standards on sanitation, health, and population." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CoNDrrIoNs IN LOCAL JAILS 17 (1976).
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